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Jordan’s Unavoidable Stake in the 
Middle East Peace Process
‘I
f we don’t plan for ourselves, we will be planned 
for.’ King Hussein’s adage about the risks inherent in 
the Middle East peace process for Jordan remains as 
true today as it did when it was delivered three decades ago. 
Despite the signature of a bilateral peace treaty with Israel in 
October 1994, almost exactly fifteen years ago, Jordan retains 
an unavoidable stake in the stalled Israeli-Palestinian peace 
process. The reasons are straightforward but worth repeating. 
Jordan has religious, economic, historical, political and social 
ties to the West Bank which, despite King Hussein’s July 1988 announcement of the severance 
of administrative links, remain salient today. The two decades of Jordanian rule between 
1948 and 1967, the Hashemites’ role as custodians of the Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem, the 
regular traffic across the Allenby bridge, the interests of its substantial Palestinian population 
and the simple facts of geography mean that Jordan must always retain a large interest in 
the future status of the West Bank. In particular, the questions of the fate of Jerusalem, the 
right of return of refugees, and water rights in the Palestinian-Israeli final status talks directly 
concern the Hashemite Kingdom. Continuing sensitivities on the issue of the Palestinian right 
of return were reflected in a speech by King Abdullah on 4 August in which he denounced 
rumours circulating in Amman to the effect that Jordan had offered Israel and the US a secret 
deal denying the Palestinian refugees resident in Jordan the right of return to their former 
homes in Israel. According to the King these rumours were harmful to Jordan’s ‘national unity 
and stability’.
The same theme was recently reflected from another, perhaps more surprising quarter. 
Hamas leader Khaled Misha’l took the opportunity, while visiting Jordan to attend his father’s 
funeral in August, to make a sophisticated speech in support both of Palestinian-Jordanian 
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solidarity, and Jordan’s national integrity. 
Rejecting the notion of any Palestinian-
Jordanian confederation prior to the creation 
of a Palestinian state, he emphasised that 
Hamas opposed any American-Israeli project 
which would ‘harm Jordan and disrupt 
its demographic balance’. Proclaiming his 
family’s Jordanian roots, Misha’l declared ‘I 
am the son of Karak and the son of Jordan. 
This is my country in which I grew up and 
for which I feel love, loyalty and belonging. 
Damned be the Sykes-Picot agreement 
which divided Jordan and Palestine into two 
states.’ Misha’l blended his protestations 
of friendship with a plea to the Jordanian 
regime: ‘hear from us instead of hearing 
about us.’ ‘Hamas is part of the solution, not 
the problem’, he claimed.
But, despite these pleas, it is unlikely that 
Jordan will again become involved in a 
dialogue with Hamas and in the search for 
Palestinian unity with its rival Fatah. The 
regime had its fingers badly burnt when 
the tentative efforts at bridge-building 
with Hamas, launched by the then Chief of 
Intelligence Mohammed al-Dahabi, were 
torpedoed by the Gaza war in December 
2008. Under apparent US pressure, contacts 
with Hamas were terminated, and Dahabi 
was removed from his post. Although Jordan 
retains good links to the Fatah leadership 
on the West Bank, it is likely to confine 
itself in future to public calls for unity, and 
private criticisms of all parties involved, rather 
than directly re-engaging in the search for 
Palestinian unity.
The under-cutting of its efforts to engage 
with Hamas during the Gaza war reflects one 
of the continuing uncomfortable realities of 
the peace process for Jordan. As outlined 
above, the regime has clear interests in the 
outcome of such a process, but very little 
ability to influence it. It must therefore use 
its contacts with the US, Israel, Fatah and 
the other Arab states to try to keep abreast, 
but not ahead, of developments. But the 
lessons of the 1990s’ peace process suggest 
that this relatively passive strategy on its own 
will be insufficient. Despite King Hussein’s 
close contacts with all of the parties involved 
during those years the Oslo process between 
Israel and the PLO still emerged from out of 
the blue for Jordan.
The best chance Jordan has to add a 
proactive element to its strategy, to plan 
rather than being planned for in Hussein’s 
terms, lies in its relations with the Obama 
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Administration. Under the Bush Administration, while Jordan’s economic ties with the US 
blossomed on the back of the earlier signature of a free trade agreement, its political role was 
largely overlooked by the Administration. Under Obama, there has been a definite change in 
tone. To begin with, King Abdullah was the first regional leader, whether Arab or Israeli, to 
visit Washington to meet the new president in April. Both the public and private tone of the 
meeting was positive and businesslike: it was clear that the new Administration saw more of a 
role for Jordan than its predecessor had done 
in helping to shape a positive Arab response 
should the Israeli-Palestinian peace process 
begin to move forward. On the personal level, 
there was also something of a generational 
bond in evidence between King Abdullah 
and President Obama. In private, though, the 
Jordanians also voiced their fears, particularly 
about the dangers posed by various Israeli 
actions in Jerusalem, including certain 
‘archaeological’ works in the vicinity of the 
Haram al-Sharif.
These Jordanian hopes and fears were both reflected in an important interview King Abdullah 
gave to The Times newspaper in May in the wake of his US visit. This appeared under the 
somewhat sensationalised headline of ‘King Abdullah of Jordan’s Warning: Peace Now or 
It’s War Next Year’. The King’s hopes centred on the ambitious regional peace plan which 
he believed the Obama Administration was preparing. This would involve not just a two-
state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, but a ‘57 state solution’ whereby the entire 
Muslim world would recognise the Jewish state as part of the peace deal. His fears meanwhile 
centred on what might happen if this ambitious agenda was stillborn. ‘If we delay our peace 
negotiations then there is going to be another conflict between Arabs or Muslims and Israel in 
the next 12-18 months’, he warned.
King Abdullah was the first regional leader 
to visit Washington to meet Barack Obama
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The dangers for Jordan itself should the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process remain 
stalled were underlined by the political storm 
surrounding a draft resolution endorsed by 
53 members of the Israeli Knesset in June 
calling for ‘two states for two peoples on the 
two banks of the River Jordan’. While the 
resolution was put forward by a member of 
the far right National Union Party the fact 
that it attracted the support of figures such 
as Labour Party leader Ehud Barak made it 
an even greater cause of political concern in 
Jordan. The fear that the ‘Jordan is Palestine’ 
slogan reflected in the resolution might one 
day be translated into policy by a frustrated 
right-wing government in Israel remains a 
persistent worry for the regime. The Knesset 
resolution prompted Jordanian Foreign 
Minister Nasser Judeh to summon the Israeli 
ambassador to deliver a formal diplomatic 
protest. While the peace treaty between 
the two states should in theory preclude 
any such threatening development in Israeli 
policy in practice the regime has pursued an 
extra insurance policy in the form of intimate 
intelligence cooperation aimed at making 
itself indispensable to Israel. Evidently, 
though, none of this weighed particularly 
heavily in the scales for the 53 Knesset 
members who supported the resolution.
For similar reasons, Jordan is likely to 
remain wary of attempts on the part of the 
Netanyahu government to draw it into some 
sort of economic solution to the Palestinian 
question on the West Bank. Thus, Prime 
Minister Netanyahu’s offer in July to extend 
the opening hours for traffic crossing the 
Allenby Bridge between the West Bank and 
Jordan was received circumspectly by the 
Jordanian government. 
In sum, then, for Jordan, it has always 
been the process part of the peace process 
which holds out the greatest dangers. No 
wonder that King Abdullah told The Times 
correspondent that ‘we are sick and tired of 
the process.’ While a stable peace, involving 
the creation of a Palestinian state in the 
West Bank and Gaza, which develops close 
economic and political ties with Jordan and 
lives at peace with Israel and its other Arab 
neighbours, would be the ideal, the process 
of getting there holds out many potential 
dangers. Will Jordan’s interests be taken 
into account as the process unfolds, or will 
they be swept to one side as more powerful 
parties pursue their own agendas? While 
Jordan is undoubtedly trying to plan for itself 
as the process unfolds the nagging question 
still remains: ‘are we being planned for?’ 
